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Slanderisation and Censure-ship: When Good Texts Went Bad in
Early Modern England
Steven Veerapen
[1] In 1653, the playwright, poet and antiquarian Arthur Wilson’s The History of Great
Britain, being the Life and Reign of King James I was published. The text included a
reflection on what had become an axiom of political culture in the Stuart age: that poetry
and libel had an interdependent relationship. To Wilson,
peace begot plenty, and plenty begot ease and wantonness, and ease and
wantonness begot poetry, and poetry swelled to that bulk in his time, that it
begot strange monstrous satires against the King’s own person, that haunted
both court and country. (Wilson 1653: 289-90)
Wilson’s jaundiced view of poetry seems fanciful; yet the rise of the verse libel in the Stuart
era is well documented. Not only do legal reports of the early modern period recognise the
problematic growth of libel, but recent scholarship has made significant inroads in tracing
the blossoming of verse libels as a distinct and multifaceted cultural mode, often containing
licentious accounts of individuals or political events (Hawarde, Reportes: 143). Indeed, the
developing vehicle of the verse libel rapidly became, as Andrew McRae notes, a recognised
feature of political and literary culture in the Stuart age (2004a: 1). These often pithy little
poems were naturally anathema to the law, not least because they were characterised by
their invariably anonymous manuscript circulation. Anonymity itself proved to be an
extremely useful means of circumventing legal reprisal, and explosive libels ‘were at one and
the same time both written and spoken, simultaneously oral and textual’; and yet the
relative success of adopting anonymity as a means of circumvention was not one with which
Elizabethan slanderers were routinely armed (Fox 1994: 65). Instead, it emerged gradually,
and was met with a flexible legal system that was willing to prosecute anyone who could be
found to have knowledge of material deemed seditious or slanderous, whether they were its
creators or not.
[2] However, Alastair Bellany has noted that ‘our understanding of the verse libel’s
genealogy is hazier than it should be’. In order to understand the rise of these texts, which
were so problematic to the Stuart regime (and worthy of exasperated recognition by
Wilson), it is useful to consider the varied means by which slanderous, libellous and
seditious discourses were disseminated and countered during the pre-Stuart period (Bellany
2007a: 1165). Although Wilson’s view might suggest a pre-Jacobean world of harmony and
industry, this was demonstrably not the case. Rather, libel and slander flourished in the
Tudor political and domestic spheres, notwithstanding the nascence of the formalised,
anonymous verse libel. Indeed, the blossoming of this particular form is arguably a product
of pre-Stuart experimentation involving various means of disseminating slanderous
discourse, as well as the testing of the power of authority to curb dissent.
[3] Slander (also known as libel, as no distinction between written and spoken words yet
existed in law) referred in the period to words spoken with malicious intent before a third
party which resulted in the demonstrable loss of reputation, credit or trade. In order for
words to be slanderous, they had to be ‘actionable’ – that is, if one wanted to sue someone
for saying them, one had to be able to demonstrate before the law that loss had been
incurred as a result of the words spoken. If accused of slander, one could plead the truth of
the words spoken (provided it could be proven), or else plead misinterpretation, with the
principle of mitior sensus (literally, the least sense) inviting an increasing number of
defendants to claim that their words had been intended without malice. This principle itself
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gained currency in the court of Common Pleas in the 1570s and 80s and sought to stem the
flow of actions for slander by maintaining that ‘no action should lie if the words could be
construed in a milder sense’ (Habermann 2003: 45). Sedition occurred when words spoken
incited rebellion or ‘brought into hatred’ individuals of higher social standing, whether a
breach of the peace was intended or not. It is tempting to think that these words had to be
false in order to be slanderous, but in the period there was a hardening of legal opinion
which resulted in the belief that true slanders against superiors were worse than false
slanders, because they laid bare the faults of an ordered society and incited disorder. During
the reign of Elizabeth, litigators and judges grappled with a variety of laws and statutes in
punishing slander, and it was not until the subsequent reign that Edward Coke was to
provide a definitive common law remedy (known as seditious, or criminal, libel), which took
the opportunity to clarify ideas and autocratic beliefs about slander, sedition and libel, the
proper prosecution of which had been the cause of vexation throughout the previous reign.
Thus the 1605 birth of the common law crime of ‘seditious libel’ brought together the laws
of slander and sedition, linking the speaking and writing of defamatory words, whether true
or false, with disorder and malice. This has led Roger Manning (1980: 100-101) to recognise
that, in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, ‘it was not necessary for
seditious utterances or writings [against the reputations and/or actions, public or private, of
public officials, magistrates and prelates] to be published, and if the facts alleged were true,
that only made the offence worse, since a true slander was more likely to cause a breach of
the peace than a public one.’
[4] In practice, the law and its agents were less than blind in their dispensing of justice.
Plebeian disputes involving injurious words spoken between neighbours were treated by the
book – truth was an acceptable defence and the rule of mitior sensus was encouraged by
judges eager to stem the flow of frivolous lawsuits. In more serious cases, however, the
terms ‘slander’ and ‘sedition’ became catch-all terms for any language deemed
inappropriate, contentious, unlicensed or illicit, regardless of its intent or the actual losses
incurred as a result of its reaching a third party. Further, authorities were keen to find and
prosecute anyone involved in the production and dissemination of any material they
deemed slanderous. As a result, original writers, publishers, owners of manuscripts or even
those simply repeating words they had heard could find themselves at the mercy of what we
might term ‘language laws’, which ranged from the statute of Scandalum Magnatum to
felony statutes, proclamations against certain books, the crime of seditious libel and the tort
of slander. Indeed, the statute of Scandalum Magnatum – which can be traced to 1275, and
provided for the punishment of those who spread defamatory rumours about important
personages of the state – was re-enacted with changes in the second year of Elizabeth’s
reign (Milsom 1981: 388). John Baker (2002: 437) notes that the statute was designed to
prevent discord between classes, ‘but the purpose of an action on the statute was clearly to
vindicate the magnate’s name by recovering damages’.
[5] Particularly during the reign of Elizabeth, various techniques of deploying libellous and
seditious speech (whilst simultaneously attempting to evade punishment) existed. Poets,
critics, and those who sought to use transgressive language attempted to benefit from the
slipperiness of the law. Some sought to adopt the rhetoric of counsel. Notoriously
unsuccessful attempts to frame speech castigated as ‘slanderous’ as conciliar attempts to
advise the government can be witnessed in John Stubbes’ The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf
(1579), and A Treatise of Treasons Against Q. Elizabeth and the Croune of England (1572).
Others invoked the classical provenance of satire. Here Alastair Bellany (2007b: 156)
recognises John Donne’s appreciation of the form when handled correctly, and Pauline
Croft (1995: 272) notes that the work of classical satirists was beginning to circulate around
literary London. Aiding such efforts were illicit presses, with perhaps the most famous
example of Elizabethan usage of illicit printing presses being the Martin Marprelate affair of
1588-9. Arguably, this celebrated episode provided lessons to would-be slanderers in the
difficulties of maintaining presses outside the ambit of authorities, whilst also providing
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evidence that anonymity and pseudonymity (later key ingredients of verse libelling) were an
invaluable means of eluding authority.
[6] Still others attempted to take advantage of the porous nature of censorship, and as a
consequence the study of early modern censorship has long provided fertile ground for
disagreement between scholars. Theories of censorship can be found in, amongst others, in
the work of M. Lindsay Kaplan (1997); Janet Clare (1999); Cyndia Clegg (2004); Debora
Shuger (2006); and Annabel Patterson (1984). Ultimately, what emerges is a sense of
censorship being a loaded term that is largely unhelpful in understanding any distinct legal
process or approach to legislating and controlling language. Further, it is one which no
longer seems suitable in historicising events and outbreaks of transgressive language which
can comprise the destruction by authors of their own work; the judicial trials of slanderous
malefactors; the unknown excisions of texts by government officials; the conscious or
unconscious regulation of spoken, written and printed language by those living in a litigious
society; the state licensing (or non-licensing) of texts; and a slew of other procedural,
cultural and legal processes.
[7] However, one method of evading legal reprisals for dissenting, slanderous or seditious
speech that has gone largely unexplored is what we might begin to term ‘slanderisation’: the
appropriation of outwardly innocent, licensed, or even ostensibly-edifying texts with
slanderous or malicious intent, particularly at moments in which circumstances or political
events can give them an unpleasant gloss. As a definition, one might think: ‘when good texts
go bad’. The very innocence of the language of such texts allowed – in theory – their
deployment to be defended on the simple, legal grounds that the speaker did not write
them; they were neither actionable nor legally defamatory and they may even have been
fully licensed by the state previously. Further, the use of slanderisation may be seen in
various walks of Elizabethan life, with religious, musical and dramatic texts engaging with
the use of seemingly innocuous compositions for scurrilous purposes.
[8] It is well-established that the early modern period coincided with a cultural, legal and
historical fascination with precedent and the reading of contemporary events in existing
texts, histories and legal cases – indeed, the common law itself was a justice system built on
precedent, as Rosemary O’Day illustrates via her provision of a useful list of the means by
which ‘precedent books’ were utilised in law teaching, with ‘one volume [used] for each
major kind of case – case, trespass, slander, promises, nuisances, etc. (2014: 167-8).’ This
led to what Johanna Rickman has described as a legal system that constituted a ‘contentious
… ongoing cultural dialect’ rather than ‘a static background’ against which people lived their
lives (2008: 15). Similarly, we know that there were anxieties surrounding the way in which
texts might be received. One can turn, for example, to the notorious case of Fulke Greville’s
manuscript Antony and Cleopatra (c1600-01). Written for a carefully limited, elite coterie,
the play was nevertheless committed to the flames by Greville himself due to concerns
raised
by the opinion of those few eyes which saw it, having some childish wantonness
in them apt enough to be construed or strained to a personating of vices in the
present governors and government. (Greville 1986 [1625]: 93)
Greville’s actions suggest, to Janet Clare a ‘climate of fear and caution’ (which is somewhat
difficult to reconcile with the proliferation of slander with which the period coincided; if
people were fearful of legal reprisals, it did not prevent them exercising their tongues, as the
volume of litigation attests [Brooks 1998: 23-24; Clare 2014: 13]). Yet misinterpretation was
not just a danger to be fearfully guarded against. It could be a welcome tool for slanderers
who might rely on material being read with a contemporary, defamatory gloss, but who
could then hope to use ‘misinterpretation’ as a mean of deflecting accusations of slander.
Such individuals could simply place blame, as Greville more ingenuously did, on the wicked
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minds of the third party: the hearers. It is thus useful to shift our focus from the
interpretation – or misinterpretation – of texts to those who took advantage of plurality of
interpretation with the knowledge that audiences would not take things in mitior sensus.
Significant also is what David Cressy (2010: 42) recognises as the tendency of early modern
readers and listeners to believe libellous words; and it is a notion supported by one
anonymous commentator on the Martin Marprelate affair, who remarked somewhat
disdainfully that Martin’s ‘seditious libels made easy way into the hartes of the vulgar
[because such people] were apt to entertaine matter of Noveltie especiallie if it have a show
of restraining the authoritie of their Superiours’ (Black 2008: xxxii). Thus, slanderers or
those with seditious intent might not have written the words they recited, nor even ‘caused
them to be written’ (as was an ancillary accusation often levelled against those accused of
reciting defamatory language), and this offers us the possibility of identifying a useful
strategy of evasion. But have we evidence for this strategy being employed?
[9] The state church and its officials were masters of defining slander and sedition through
their legal authority over language and their ecclesiastical right to condemn and punish
slanders which pertained to moral and spiritual offences. However, this mastery extended
to their slanderisation of Biblical texts in the pursuit of religious and political goals.
Certainly this strategy was famously employed in early modern Scotland, where tensions
between Church and monarch were more sharply drawn, particularly during the tenure of
John Knox. Queen Mary’s censure-ship did not bear fruit, but her short-lived husband
Henry Stuart had slightly more success in forbidding the cleric from preaching for fifteen
days following a 1565 sermon that likened the monarchs to Ahab and Jezebel. In England, a
1569 sermon by the clergyman Edward Dering, who had been disgraced for his provocative
preaching in the past, began with his casting the blame for his disgrace on ‘the slanderous
tongues of many envious men’, before going on to preach the necessity of ‘the plain law of
the Lord’. ‘This law’, Dering asserts, he ‘knows not how your Majesty shall interpret,
because I know not your spirit’ (Dering 1971 [1569-70]: 139). The language is breathtakingly
disingenuous; Dering’s attempt to lay blame for any potentially malicious interpretation of
his allusions on the listener – the queen – is obvious. As he expounds vociferously on the
Biblical precedents of ‘David disallowing wicked men in his house and Asa putting down
idols’, we can see in practice a preacher simultaneously deflecting accusations of attacking
the queen whilst tacitly inviting consideration of religious reform and professing not to
know what constructions might be put upon his language. It is in such performances that we
see in practice what M. Lindsay Kaplan recognises as the peculiar ‘boomerang effect’ of
slander (Kaplan 1997: 90).
[10] This process of appropriating what is in this case an unimpeachably upright text with
the express purpose of criticising existing policy was one which was understood by early
modern English clergymen. However, it would be dangerous to overestimate the success of
Dering’s strategy; as he notes in his sermon, he has ‘heard of how much your highness
misliked of me’ (Dering 1971 [1569-70]: 140). In the absence of a realistic ability to ban or
censor particular religious texts at impolitic moments, the disfavour of the queen might
instead be considered a singular politico-religious indication of what was and was not
condoned.
[11] Certainly Queen Elizabeth was ever apt to remind her preachers that they were her
subjects. Peter McCullough recounts in particular the 1565 sermon of Alexander Nowell
(against religious images), to which Elizabeth bluntly announced, ‘do not talk about that’
(1998: 47). Nowell attempted to continue his sermon, resulting in further interruption from
the queen, who instructed him to ‘leave that – it has nothing to do with your subject and is
now threadbare’. McCullough notes also the 1579 incident in which the queen pointedly
turned her back on the pulpit when a preacher launched into a sermon attacking her
mooted match with the Duc d’Alençon. Certainly, in a system in which was encoded a
network of patronage and favour, those who sought preferment in public office could thus
2/11/2020 » Slanderisation and Censure-ship: When Good Texts Went Bad in Early Modern England
https://www.northernrenaissance.org/slanderisation-and-censure-ship-when-good-texts-went-bad-in-early-modern-england/ 6/13
take their cue from royal reactions to particular textual allusions. As a consequence, we
might consider the Elizabethan approach to ‘slanderised’ religious text as not censorship,
but censure-ship. Governmental attitudes to what was and was not permissible did not have
to be enforced by legal means or explicit diktats, but could rather be expressed through
informal channels. Here was not brazen nonconformity, but resistance and criticism voiced
in the language of conformity and expressed in the guise of wholesome religious texts, the
preaching of which was one of the cornerstones of the Elizabethan religious settlement.
[12] Church figures’ deployment of otherwise acceptable texts in a deliberately provocative
manner (and their subsequent ‘censure-ship’) do not, however, provide the only examples of
the use of and reaction to slanderisation. In her comprehensive overview of the circulation
of ballads in early modern England (2014), Jenni Hyde has recognised the extent to which
the Tudor regime viewed the seductive language and attractive tunes employed by ballads as
a potential menace. Interestingly, Hyde also recounts the case of a particular ballad’s
seditious afterlife. ‘The Hunt is Up’ was a popular tune at the centre of court life during
Henry VIII’s reign, with the earliest form of the text, attributed to William Gray, reading:
The hunt is up, the hunt is up,
And it is a well nigh day;
And Harry our king has gone hunting,
To bring his deer to bay.
(Gray 1533: 60)
Although the text appears fairly innocuous, the melody was appropriated by one John
Hogon during the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1537, with lyrics added that complained ‘the
masters of arte and doctors of dyvynyte / have brought the realme owght of good unite’
(Hyde 2014: 233). As Chappell and Macfarren recognise, Hogon’s alleged crime was failing
to comply with a 1533 proclamation, which was issued ‘to suppress fond books, ballads,
rhymes, and other lewd treatises in the English tongue’, by ‘singing with a crowd or a
fyddyll’ a political song to that tune (1859: 60). Chappell and Macfarren’s study of the
ballad’s history is illuminating. In addition to the legal circumstances of its 1537
appropriation by Hogon, the tune is also noted as being referred to as a good one for
dancing in the Complaynt of Scotland (1549) and as having a number of parodic and
theatrical afterlives. More pertinently, however, Chappell and Macfarren recognise that in
the Hogon episode, ‘some of the words are inserted in the information [i.e. the Privy Council
records], but they were taken down from the recitation and not given as verse’. The
hesitance to proliferate slanderous material, even in the confines of the courtroom, can be
found also in the proceedings of the Star Chamber. In a 1596 case, the Lord Keeper
lamented that one libeller ‘made this Court (of such authority and state that [the Lord
Keeper had] not heard nor read of the like in the world) an instrument to publish [and]
record his blasphemies, and to have the nobles of the land from her Ma[jes]ties side, vpon
whose sacred person they showlde attend, to hear his slanders and libels’ Ultimately, he
ordered the depositions ‘to be withdrawn from the Courte’ (Hawarde, Reportes: 55).
[13] Evidently, ballads provided a genre capable of being mutated, repackaged and
reworded according to the intentions of those spreading them. The slanderisation of this
curiously universal genre therefore provides us with evidence that it was not just the
original language of innocent texts that could prove a handy tool for those wishing to
slander enemies and sow sedition, but musical arrangements and form. As Hyde further
notes, ballads thus constitute ‘a sophisticated form of knowingness [that] could, on
occasion, be created by … tune alone (2014: 237).’ It is no great leap to assume that a tune
known for its associations with the royal court would, when misused, invite mocking
criticism of the court itself. Popular melodies could therefore become laden with meaning
and cultural associations, and that meaning could be manipulated via alteration of lyrics or
usage in incongruous or sensitive situations. As Peter Lake and Steve Pincus remind us,
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‘there were emerging protocols to be observed when having recourse to the politics of
popularity, but they remained hazy and ill defined, and it was always horribly easy to fall
over the edge into sedition’ (2007: 7). Hogon, in his appropriation of a popular melody in
order to take advantage of its cultural associations, did not fall over the edge, but willingly
leapt.
[14] In the case of ‘The Hunt is Up’, Hogon performed his version of the ballad in the homes
of Robert Frances, John Kettleburgh and John Harlen, relying on the tune’s royal
provenance to encourage criticism of Henry’s policies. However, his audience recognised his
attempt at deliberately slanderising the popular tune and reported him to their local
authorities. The men in his rural audience claimed to be unable to understand some of the
veiled references in the song, and those references ‘served as protection for both parties:
Hogon’s words did not become unmistakably seditious until they were explained and the
Norfolk men could not be accused of troublemaking if they had not understood the meaning
of the song without that elucidation’ (Hyde 2014: 234). The slanderisation of a musical
piece, at least on this occasion, was confounded by the unwillingness of the audience to
become complicit in enjoying the seditious overtones of its topical deployment. But
nevertheless they were sufficiently aware of the manipulation of the tune to report it, and
investigators were sufficiently aware of the propensity for musical ballads to have political
repercussions to take action. As a method of resistance and dissent, slanderisation was, we
might conclude, unsuccessful – but only insofar as Hogon had the misfortune of performing
his slanderised version of ‘The Hunt is Up’ before an unreceptive audience.
[15] Yet the very fact that a musical piece – a fairly simple tune – could provide those
looking to disseminate slanderous and seditious language with a vehicle is one which
requires further consideration, for echoes of Hogon’s strategy can be found on the popular
stage. In the anonymously-authored Thomas of Woodstock, the tendency of authorities to
fret about the power of music in circulating dangerous speech is, seemingly, held up to
ridicule. Although it has been argued that the play postdates Shakespeare, it is often
speculated as being a source for Shakespeare’s Richard II (MacDonald P. Jackson: 2002).
Central to the plot is the depiction of events in England prior to the murder of Richard’s
uncle, Thomas of Woodstock, and the play includes the corrupt machinations of the king’s,
favourite, Lord Chief Justice Tresilian. As Tresilian’s paranoia and avarice grow in inverse
proportion to the civil liberties of the king’s subjects, Richard’s tyranny – as, typically,
refracted through Tresilian – is highlighted in the actions of the favourite’s subordinates:
Nimble: Close again Master Bailiff, he comes another whisperer, I see by some
– oh villain, he whistles treason! I’ll lay hold of him myself.
Whistler: Out alas, what do ye mean sir?
Nimble: A rank traitor Master Bailiff. Lay hold on him, for he has most
erroneously and rebelliously whistled treason.
Whistler: Whistled treason! Alas sir, how can that be?
Bailiff: Very easily sir. There’s a piece of treason that flies up and down the
country in the likeness of a ballad, and this being the very tune of it thou hast
whistled treason.
Whistler: Alas sir, ye know I spake not a word.
Nimble: That’s all one: if any man whistles treason ‘tis as ill as speaking it.
Mark me Master Bailiff, the bird whistles that cannot speak, and [yet] there be
birds in a manner that can speak too: your raven will call ye [rascal], your crow
will call ye knave, Master Bailiff. Ergo, he that can whistle can speak, and
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therefore this fellow hath both spoke and whistled treason.
(Thomas of Woodstock 2002, III.iii.1685-1701)
To Sandra Clark, this exchange depicts a police state under Richard II’s rule; to Irving
Ribner, it underscores ‘the corruption of law … [and] the utter perversion of order in the
tyranny of Tresilian and his men’ (2007: 97; 2005: 137). Neither reading, however, situates
the text within its contemporary framework. The alacrity with which Nimble and the Bailiff
are quick to identify the Whistler’s melody as treasonous, and in particular as flying ‘up and
down the country in the likeness of a ballad’ would likely have struck Elizabethan audiences
as entirely plausible, even if laughable. The Whistler’s protestations, too, take on a different
complexion given what we know about slanderisation. Although his defence seems
reasonable, it is just as possible that the character invites audiences – familiar with the
power of melodies to carry seditious overtones – to consider whether he is really as
uncomprehending as he claims. Of course, even if he is entirely innocent of the knowledge
of the treasonous gloss attached to his tune, the problem faced by authorities remains: how
can dissent be controlled when slanderisation brings with it plausible deniability? With this
understanding, what seems like a caustic depiction of Richard II’s England actually
encourages comparison with contemporary attempts to control discourse. If the ostensibly
Plantagenet desire to find criminal activity in the whistling of a tune is thus held to be a
‘perversion of order’, then so too is the Tudor response to the slanderisation of ballads seen
in the John Hogon episode.
[16] Adding weight to the notion that the Whistler’s defence is purposefully ambiguous is
the preceding arrest of a Schoolmaster for writing a libel in verse against Tresilian. The
illiterate bailiff, despite the Schoolmaster’s witty attempt at defending himself for his libel,
is as quick to hear ‘the most shameful treason’ (III.iii.1671-2) as he is when he hears the
‘treasonous’ whistling. A number of issues arise from the zealous efforts of Nimble and the
Bailiff. Firstly, as the Schoolmaster is guilty, a shadow is thrown over the Whistler’s use of a
tune recognisable as seditious. The Whistler’s defence – that he had lost his calves and
mistook the Bailiff and Nimble for them – is dubious, as is the apparent coincidence that he
would chance upon the tune of a ballad which even the illiterate Bailiff recognises as having
acquired seditious overtones.
[17] From Schoolmaster to cowherd, the willingness to give voice to and immediately deny
dissent makes, as the Bailiff states, dangerous speech likely to fly ‘up and down the country’.
It will also be noted that the Schoolmaster is engaged in reciting his railing rhyme (which he
acknowledges as ‘little better than libels’ [III.iii.1630) to his serving man, with the
suggestion thus made the lower orders are as eager to learn dangerous speech as their
masters are to compose it. But here we must also recognise resonances of what Hyde has
described as the ubiquity of the ballad as ‘experienced throughout society in homes and on
the street, in cottages and at court, in taverns and at the theatre’ (2014: 34). The
Schoolmaster’s use of unambiguous libel (despite his specious claims to the contrary)
throws into doubt the protestations of ignorance by the whistling cowherd. Although the
Bailiff, as a representative of authority, is portrayed as an illiterate buffoon, his instinctive
willingness to ‘hear’ treason in the poetic words and tunes of others is less a mark of social
perversion than an aggressively anxious reaction to a real problem. If the Whistler is
innocent, he is damned not by the Bailiff and Nimble alone, but by the Schoolmaster’s
willingness to libel authority and thus excite the instincts of autocrats; if he is guilty, his
denial is plausible and audiences are invited to sympathise with a figure knowingly engaged
in slanderising a text. Neither libelling nor overly zealous state responses to libelling emerge
from the play as clear and unproblematic processes. If the England of Thomas of Woodstock
is a police state, then it is a remarkably familiar one, containing many of the tensions
between willing (and chancing) dissenters and frustrated, somewhat oversensitive
authorities recognisable in the late-Tudor state. More likely, however, the humour of the
scene suggests less a strictly authoritarian state (and less still Janet Clare’s ‘climate of fear
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and caution’), than a faintly ridiculous game of negotiation and exchange between
dissenters and authorities, with deniability and stiff-necked refusal to accept deniability at
loggerheads, especially during moments of crisis. If one recognises a climate of fear and
caution in the play’s treatment of the Schoolmaster and the Whistler, it is on the part of the
Bailiff and Nimble rather than the two slander-peddling citizens.
[18] Through its depiction of the arrests (and protests) of the composer of a libel and the
whistler of a tune, Thomas of Woodstock illustrates the limitations of both verbal and
melodic transmission of transgressive sentiments. As long as one made impermissible
sounds – or, rather, words or noises which could be interpreted as slanderous or seditious –
the potential existed for authorities to make an association with libellous or even treasonous
activity. Yet music and verse were, quite clearly, effective (and popular, if tunes or words
gained currency) ways of dissenting. As a consequence, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
anonymous, handwritten verse libel became a means of voicing dissent without using one’s
voice in the decades following the play’s composition.
[19] As Greg Walker and Henry James have noted, theatregoers were particularly apt to
view events on the stage as having contemporary resonances (1995: 109-121). Furthermore,
responding to Annabel Patterson’s study of censorship, interpretation and the relationship
between poets and the state, Richard Dutton has noted that governments could not hope to
regulate what people would think or link to a text to at any given moment (2000: xv).
However, the corollary of this is that neither could malicious slanderers and seditionists,
whose reliance on timeliness, topicality and unpredictable audience reception underpinned
their opportunistic borrowing of texts. Nevertheless, what authorities could and did do was
to seek to find the intent behind words recited at moments at which they judged them to
become laden with unacceptable or potentially dangerous meaning. Slanderisation thus
became an unstable, almost paradoxical process: the texts appropriated derived their
scurrilous gloss from fleeting events, and yet fleeting events are what instigated
authoritarian crackdowns on literary expression.
[20] This certainly seems to have been the rationale behind the Earl of Essex’s famous
commissioning of Richard II’s performance immediately prior to his abortive rebellion in
1601. The play’s subject matter had been burdened with a history of contention, and
interesting questions arise here about the censorship of non-dramatic historical works, and
the extent to which this implies that early modern audiences were likely to consider history
as analogous to contemporary events. Licensed historical texts could provide ready-made,
popular conduits for commenting subversively on events, in essence acting as scripts which
invited slanderisation. We should therefore not be surprised to find that more mechanised
state censorship was occasionally used in the publication of historical material. Indeed,
Cyndia Clegg (2014) provides a useful history of the (rather haphazard) censorship of
Holinshed’s Chronicles, which is itself accepted as a source for Shakespeare’s Richard II.
Yet the play itself had been fully licensed and entered into the Stationer’s Register in 1597;
yet its performance on the eve of an uprising against the sovereign saw the players brought
before the Privy Council for questioning. The fact that the company was soon released and
apparently swiftly restored to royal favour is particularly interesting, raising as it does
issues concerning the differing intent behind the performers and the commissioners of the
production. Evidently, the inherent legality of the text, combined with the fact that the
players recited it without malicious intent on their part, may have been sufficient for
investigators to conclude that the actors’ performance of a text which had been in legal
circulation for decades be taken in mitior sensus. The use of the legal rule applied in slander
cases is deliberate. Censorship of the play had evidently failed to prevent its staging, and the
laws of slander and libel did not apply to actors innocently reciting non-actionable words
which had previously been endorsed by the state. Yet the fact that they were interrogated
and their actions open to authoritarian scrutiny prevents us from concluding that the
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slanderisation of the text – at least on the part of Essex and his followers, who were the
seditionists – proved successful.
[21] Interestingly, it might be argued that Shakespeare and his company were aware that
the performance of play texts and their multiplicity of interpretations – whether innocent or
subversive – was something to be recognised and guarded against. Casting blame for
malicious interpretation on the interpreters rather than the speakers or writers was an
invaluable, even a playful strategy. Puck’s speech in A Midsummer Night’s Dream provides
us with ratification of this, as he defends insubstantial, formless and motiveless actors.
If we shadows have offended,
Think but this, and all is mended—
That you have but slumbered here
While these visions did appear.
And this weak and idle theme,
No more yielding but a dream,
Gentles, do not reprehend.
If you pardon, we will mend.
And, as I am an honest Puck,
If we have unearnèd luck
Now to ’scape the serpent’s tongue
(Shakespeare 1979 [1595], V.i.417-427)
In particular, we might note the subtle turning of blame for any offence on the ‘slumbering’
audiences, and Puck’s eagerness to escape the ‘serpent’s tongue’ – an image not far divorced
from the tongues of evil-minded, slanderous misinterpreters, who were invariably
conceptualised as being dangerously venomous. The perception of slander as a ‘poison’ was
an enduring trope. Commentators such as Thomas Adams were apt to consider slander as a
form of oral poison, which passed through the ear and corrupted the soul. Of more pressing
concern was the notion that the audience could be ‘implicated in [a slanderous text’s]
immorality’ (Bellany 2007b: 151). A hissing, hostile, offended audience thus makes itself the
venomous slanderer – if, of course, we believe that Puck is honest and innocent of malicious
intent. At any rate, Shakespeare recognised that theatrical audiences had the power to react
negatively, and defence against negative reaction was required by those whose words – and,
as we have seen, even whose use of music – could be construed in an actionable or
otherwise scurrilous sense. Again we can identify a method of defence as being to deftly cast
blame for slanderous interpretation on those who constructed it; but once again the
slanderer finds himself in the position of having to make such a defence and ‘mend’ the
suddenly hostile relationship between actor and audience. Once again, speaking publicly
places power in the hands of the hearer, even if the speaker has a strategy in place to either
‘make amends’ or blame the hearer for a negative reception.
[22] Ultimately, these examples indicate that slanderisation was not, as it might be
tempting to imagine, a safe or reliable way of evading either censorship or slander and
sedition accusations, but it was certainly tested out despite the unpredictability of its
reception. Thus we might consider the invitation for audiences to read defamatory,
seditious and topical allusions to their contemporaries one of several methods tried prior to
the introduction of the free press. Slanderisation failed if one could not trust one’s audience
to be complicit and refrain from forcing an explanation of the meaning behind the words
spoken. Nevertheless, the process of deploying outwardly innocuous texts with scurrilous
intent erodes any comfortable understanding of censorship as an active programme focused
on preventing unquestionably provocative or actionable speech. All texts – be they religious,
literary or musical – have afterlives which may involve unexpected subversion for scurrilous
or slanderous purposes – and this has implications for studies of censorship, legal
development and literary history.
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[23] Thus, we might return to Arthur Wilson’s recognition of the growth of verse libels and
their indication of a subversive link between poetry and slanderous language. Having now
witnessed the rather unreliable appropriation of innocent texts (religious, dramatic and
musical) and their potentially hostile reception, it is clear that slanderisation was a method
tested by early modern malcontents, and found lacking. As a result, we can glimpse another
paving stone in the road to the popular Stuart verse libel. Yet it must be noted that these
cases of singers, clergymen and players being caught or questioned are generally isolated or
at least remarkable cases, usually due to their textual deployment reaching hostile
audiences or the attention of authorities (which was obviously the point, particularly in the
case of religious sermons, the subversive glosses of which were intended to inspire changes
in religious policy). What we cannot know is how widespread this practice of slanderisation
was at moments of political stability; bureaucratic inefficiency; legal relaxation; when
audiences simply failed to interpret things in scurrilous ways; or even when they did but
were sympathetic, and the intended double-meanings were kept quiet.
[24] Having thus recognised slanderisation as a process, we might ask a number of
questions. Were innocent songs sung at politically-sensitive times in rural towns, with
audiences secretly enjoying the naughty pleasure of interpreting them as slanderous? Were
Biblical allusions made against the queen in prophesyings and sermons which have not yet
been scrutinised with a view to assessing their potential scurrility? Were plays performed
which mocked specific figures and events which are now obscure to us, and which went
either unnoticed or unpunished? The answers to these questions are elusive. Yet it is
nevertheless evident that although the process of slanderisation is recognisable from those
moments in which it failed, this does not preclude it having been used successfully in ways
which would, by virtue of that success, be unlikely to come to our attention via court
records, governmental investigations or reports of royal displeasure. What these episodes
do tell us is that using existing texts in order to invite slanderous interpretation was a risky
business, and though it offered the potential avenue of innocent intent and not being the
original author, neither were robust safeguards against censure-ship or intermittent
authoritarianism. As long as one used one vocalised material, there were means by which
authorities could apportion blame and punishment if that material found itself taking on a
dark complexion.
[25] In order to build a fuller picture of the period’s relationship with transgressive
language, it is crucial that scholars of early modern slander and censorship widen their
scope of study beyond obviously slanderous and seditious texts and pay greater attention to
the misuse of licit and innocuous texts – and even musical arrangements – for slanderous
and seditious purposes. In a culture accustomed to the sensitivity of language and the legal
repercussions of deploying explicitly proscripted speech and writing, it is necessary to
consider the ways in which shifting and evolving legal and political circumstances could
turn good language bad, as well as the opportunities afforded to individuals in twisting (or
inviting alternative interpretations of) the meanings of innocent, licensed texts.
University of Strathclyde
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